Abstract
This paper objects to a popular set of claims that inform answers to a longstanding question of political morality, the Question of Permissible Political Action: Under what conditions, if any, are political officials morally permitted to make or enforce law—at least partly because they are political officials? This set of claims, which I call 'the Right-to-Rule Framework,' holds that such actions by political officials are permissible in virtue of the state's possession of a right to rule. I argue, however, that the Right-to-Rule Framework encounters four significant difficulties when answering the Question of Permissible Political Action. First, I note that while many defenses of the Right-to-Rule Framework are motivated by the claim that political actions are permissible only if there's a moral obligation to obey the law, this claim is undermotivated, and we should not treat this as a desideratum for any adequate answer to the Question of Permissible Political Action. Second, I note that the possession of the right to rule is not necessary for the permissibility of particular political actions. Third, I consider and reject the argument that morally permissible political actions in the absence of a right to rule are merely justified. Fourth, I contend that we have reasons to doubt that a right to rule is sufficient for the permissibility of particular political actions because such sufficiency claims are either implausible or, when suitably modified, deprive the right to rule of its explanatory power. Before concluding, I consider what sorts of views would make sense if we were to reject some—or all—of the Right-to-Rule Framework.